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Abstract 
Baron and Jost (this issue) present three critiques of our meta-analysis demonstrating similar 
levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives: 1) that the studies we examined were biased 
toward finding symmetrical bias among liberals and conservatives, 2) that the studies we 
examined do not measure partisan bias but rather rational Bayesian updating, and 3) that social 
psychology is not biased in favor of liberals but biased instead toward creating false 
equivalencies. We respond in turn that: 1) the included studies covered a wide variety of issues at 
the core of contemporary political conflict and fairly compared bias by establishing conditions 
under which both liberals and conservatives would have similar motivations and opportunity to 
demonstrate bias, 2) we carefully selected studies that were least vulnerable to Bayesian 
counterexplanation and most scientists and laypeople consider these studies demonstrations of 
bias, and 3) there is reason to be vigilant about liberal bias in social psychology, but this does not 
preclude concern about other possible biases, all of which threaten good science. We close with 
recommendations for future research and urge researchers to move beyond broad generalizations 
of political differences that are insensitive to time and context. 
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Partisan Bias and Its Discontents 
When we decided to conduct a meta-analysis examining susceptibility to partisan bias across 
the political spectrum (Ditto et al., this issue), we expected that whatever we found would be 
contentious, celebrated by some and challenged by others. Debates about psychological theory 
and methods can be contentious enough of course, but our topic’s unavoidable entanglement 
with politics, at a time when politics itself is so deeply contentious, led us to gird ourselves for a 
heated debate about the validity and meaning of our findings, however they turned out. 
Because of this, our approach has been deliberately agnostic. We approached this project 
from the outset as an empirical test of two competing hypotheses: the asymmetry hypothesis 
(predicting greater partisan bias in conservatives than in liberals) and the symmetry hypothesis 
(predicting equivalent levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives). We had no a priori 
preference or expectation for either hypothesis, and did our best to fairly review the existing 
literature—a literature that provides support for both positions. In fact, as much as we would like 
readers to view our agnosticism on the symmetry question as noble scientific restraint, much of it 
flowed from genuine uncertainty about what our meta-analysis might find. Our own lab has 
previously published findings generally consistent with both the asymmetry (Liu & Ditto, 2013; 
Wojcik, Hovasapian, Graham, Motyl, & Ditto, 2015) and symmetry positions (Uhlmann, Pizarro, 
Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009).   
Our methodological strategy was targeted. We examined one prototypical form of partisan 
bias: the tendency to evaluate otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports 
rather than challenges one’s political affinities. We chose this focus because experiments 
documenting this judgment pattern are common in the empirical literature, and because it 
captures a familiar form of bias frequently bemoaned in every day political discourse (i.e., 
“hypocritically” being more charitable to people, policies, and information on one’s own side of 
the political aisle than on the other). We restricted our analysis to only those studies where the 
strongest inferences about bias could be drawn: experiments in which both liberal and 
conservative participants were asked to make targeted evaluative judgments about virtually 
identical pieces of information carefully manipulated to be either politically congenial or 
politically uncongenial.  
Our study uncovered evidence consistent with the symmetry hypothesis. Across 51 studies 
varying widely in the political topics they examined and the specific methods they used, both 
liberal and conservative participants showed a robust tendency to find otherwise identical 
information more valid and compelling when it confirmed rather than challenged their political 
affinities. This tendency was no more pronounced on one side of the political aisle than on the 
other.  
In short, we are confident in the conceptualization and conduct of our meta-analysis and that 
the reported results accurately capture the extant experimental literature on this particular form 
of partisan bias. We are equally confident, however, that our findings do not settle the 
ideological symmetry debate, and that many fascinating questions bearing on the relative 
judgmental virtues of liberals and conservatives remain to be addressed. 
In that spirit, we appreciate Baron and Jost’s (this issue, henceforth B&J) vigorous critique of 
our research. We find their analysis and conclusions flawed in a number of ways, but believe that 
their comments serve well to highlight crucial methodological and conceptual issues that need to 
be further debated and clarified, and we welcome the chance to start that process here.  
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In the following pages, we address each of B&J’s critiques, and then turn our attention to 
future research directions. We will address what B&J refer to as “anomalous outcomes” of our 
analyses in the attached supplement. A key theme of our response is the importance of moving 
beyond the framing of the ideological symmetry debate as a unidimensional question of whether 
one side of the political aisle is more “biased” than the other. That framing is seductive, and we 
admit that our own writing falls prey to it as well, but it promotes a perspective that is both 
overly political and insufficiently nuanced as psychological analysis. Instead, we suggest a more 
multidimensional path forward, one that recognizes that bias can occur at multiple points in the 
information processing sequence, that liberal and conservative are broad self-descriptions that 
contain multiple and distinct political and psychological elements, and that contextual factors 
play a crucial role in how, when, and in whom political biases manifest themselves. 
Addressing Critiques 
B&J present three primary critiques of our meta-analysis: 1) that the studies we examine are 
not representative of political judgments in the real world and instead are biased toward finding 
symmetrical bias among liberals and conservatives, 2) that the studies we examine do not 
actually measure partisan bias but demonstrate rational Bayesian updating instead, and 3) that the 
fields of social and political psychology are not biased in favor of more positive views of liberals 
and instead are biased toward constructing a false narrative of equivalence between liberals and 
conservatives. We address each critique in turn. 
Is bias research biased? 
The first criticism B&J forward is that the studies we examined involved topics that are not 
“statistically representative of the entire population of ideological differences in public opinion” 
(p. 12). Instead, they argue that the researchers who performed the studies were motivated to 
select topics that would produce symmetrical patterns of bias. Though speculative, these points 
are worth considering.  
First, B&J correctly note that the overwhelming majority of the studies included in our meta-
analysis were not designed to test the symmetry-asymmetry question. The majority did not even 
report separate results for liberals and conservatives (we had to email the authors for the 
necessary data). It is possible that researchers disinterested in comparing the two side’s proclivity 
toward biased judgment would gravitate, either intentionally or inadvertently, toward topics that 
they believed would evoke equal bias on both sides. It seems equally plausible, however, that 
predominantly liberal researchers might gravitate toward topics that would downplay liberal bias, 
either because of an active desire to portray conservatives unfavorably, or more likely because 
conservative bias would be easier to recognize due to the difficulty people have detecting their 
own judgmental shortcomings (Pronin, 2007).1 Of course, any suggestion that the body of 
research we examined was systematically biased toward either symmetry or asymmetry is mere 
conjecture. One advantage of meta-analysis is the ability to derive conclusions from the work of 
multiple researchers who are unlikely to all share a consistent set of motivations or 
methodological blindspots. 
In our view, that the majority of the included studies were conducted without our core 
hypotheses in mind is a strength of our meta-analysis rather than a weakness. The questionable 
                                               
1 We would expect the same phenomena to operate in the opposite direction if the field were composed 
predominantly of conservative researchers. 
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research practices that lie at the very heart of our field’s current replicability crisis arise when 
researchers have favored hypotheses that influence their design and analysis choices (e.g., 
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Because very few of the included studies were 
conducted with the goal of comparing the quality of liberal and conservative judgments, 
concerns about directional motives of researchers are minimized. 
But even if a researcher was interested explicitly in comparing the magnitude of bias in 
liberals and conservatives, a fair test of that question would have to establish conditions under 
which both sides have similar motivations and equal opportunity to demonstrate bias. We have 
little doubt that researchers selected topics for which they thought liberals and conservatives 
were likely to have similar but oppositional preferences (e.g., pro vs. anti-capital punishment, 
Democrat vs. Republican candidate), but symmetrical preferences need not manifest as 
symmetrical bias. Democrats and Republicans could have similar proclivities to favor their own 
political parties, but when presented with a particular policy, Democrats could evaluate the 
policy based entirely on the specific content and stated consequences of the policy, whereas 
Republicans could rely heavily on party cues. It was just this sort of effect—differential bias in 
response to conditions with similar political significance for each group—that our meta-analysis 
was intended to isolate and examine.  
The strategy B&J offer to address their concerns is to examine a “sufficiently large” sample 
of topics such that those issues will be representative of all political topics. We doubt that it is 
practical or even possible to define the entire population of political opinions, nor to specify a 
statistically representative sample of those opinions that would be resilient over even relatively 
short periods of time and that all or even most psychologists (and political scientists) would 
agree upon. Our meta-analysis included judgments about many of the most contentious topics in 
modern political discourse, including capital punishment, gun control, abortion, welfare, 
healthcare, global warming, same-sex marriage, affirmative action, immigration, education 
policies, abstinence education, tax policies, presidential behavior, outsourcing, campaign tactics, 
and medical marijuana (see Table 1 in Ditto et al., this issue). We have no evidence to suggest 
that this list is representative of all possible political topics, but it hardly seems like what B&J 
describe as “a very small and unrepresentative set of issues that were hand-picked in part to 
avoid ideological asymmetries” (p. 12). As we note in our original piece, there is good reason to 
believe that the magnitude of partisan bias—both overall and its relative strength in liberals and 
conservatives—differs across political topics and over time, and these differences can offer 
important clues about determinants and boundary conditions (Crawford, 2012; Federico & 
Malka, 2018). But given the robustness of our findings across the wide range of topics examined, 
we believe the most scientifically reasonable position at this point in time is that ideological 
symmetry looks more like a feature of this particular form of partisan bias than a bug.2 
Is partisan bias rational? 
The second criticism B&J offer is that the studies we meta-analyzed do not demonstrate 
partisan bias at all, but rather are simply evidence of rational (Bayesian) belief updating. 
                                               
2 We also doubt that the body of research supporting ideological asymmetry is as invulnerable to the 
“unrepresentativeness” criticism as B&J claim. This research does not compare liberals and conservatives on a 
representative sample of psychological characteristics nor use a representative sample of items to measure those 
characteristics. Minor word adjustments alter whether liberals or conservatives appear more dogmatic or 
authoritarian (Conway et al., 2016; Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2017). 
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According to B&J’s account, it is “perfectly rational to evaluate new information on the basis of 
prior beliefs” (B&J p. 7), and so the results from the studies we examined can be seen as 
irrelevant to issues of partisan bias.  
Disentangling bias from rationality (both conceptually and empirically) is an old and 
venerable issue in psychology, one that researchers studying perceptual and judgmental biases 
have wrestled with for decades (see Ditto, 2009 for a detailed treatment of this history, but also 
Erdelyi, 1974; Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). The issue has 
also received considerable attention in the specific context of political judgment and decision 
making (e.g., Bullock, 2009; Gerber & Green, 1999; Kahan, 2016; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 
2008; Taber & Lodge, 2006). As such, B&J were right to raise this interpretational ambiguity as 
an issue to be considered in evaluating the results of our meta-analysis. That is why we raised it 
throughout our report as well (pp. 2-3, p. 5 and in the associated footnote #2 on p. 15, pp. 12-13). 
In fact, rather than “ignoring this crucial caveat” (B&J p. 14), our meta-analytic approach was 
structured explicitly to address and minimize this very problem. If we failed to explain 
sufficiently how we addressed this problem in our original report, let us try to clarify that here. 
Bayesian reasoning is a normative account of how beliefs should be updated in response to 
new information. Its central insight is that the updating of beliefs based on new information must 
be considered in the context of prior beliefs. According to Bayes Theorem, this is accomplished 
by multiplying one’s prior probability that a given belief is correct by the likelihood ratio 
associated with the new information (which can be roughly equated with the perceived validity 
of the new information) to generate a new belief (the posterior probability in Bayesian terms). 
Based on this logic, B&J argue that the pattern of results we forwarded as evidence of partisan 
bias is simply evidence of rational information processing. If a scientific study (or any other new 
piece of information) supports your prior beliefs about a topic, then it is rational to assume that it 
is a valid piece of information, but if that information contradicts your prior beliefs, then it is 
rational to assume that it is an invalid piece of information. 
 This kind of normative counterexplanation (not always strictly Bayesian, but always 
involving a rationality-based analysis) has historically been invoked to explain data ostensibly 
demonstrating various types of biased judgment including motivated reasoning (Ditto, 2009). 
Individual studies have effectively refuted normative accounts of motivated reasoning using a 
variety of methodological strategies including equating prior beliefs across conditions (Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Munro, Apanovich, Scepansky, & Lockhart, 2003; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, 
Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998) and demonstrating that--inconsistent with an account based on 
cold, rational information processing--the tendency to derogate the validity of information that 
challenges one’s beliefs or desires is mediated by affect (Ditto et al., 2003; Munro & Ditto, 
1997). Because this kind of tight methodological control is not possible when meta-analyzing 
existing data, however, we took a different approach: we used two inclusion criteria to restrict 
the studies we examined to those that were least amenable to a rational belief updating account. 
First, we restricted our analysis to studies where the measure of partisan bias involved a 
specific assessment of the validity/quality of the new information. A frequently overlooked 
nuance of Bayes theorem is that it directly accounts for the effect of priors on the posterior 
probability, but it is silent on how the likelihood ratio of new information should be determined. 
In other words, it is perfectly rational for one’s belief in some proposition after exposure to new 
information to be influenced by one’s prior level of belief in that proposition (see footnote #2 
[p.15] of our original piece). This rational belief updating process (which involves the effect of 
PARTISAN BIAS AND ITS DISONTENT   6 
 
prior beliefs on post-information belief aka the posterior probability) should not be confused, 
however, with the less rational process of using consistency with one’s priors to assess the 
validity of the new information (i.e., the likelihood ratio; Kahan, 2016). There are independent 
truth convergent criteria for evaluating the validity of information, and an individual who fails to 
incorporate these criteria into their judgments cannot be said to be acting in a fully rational 
fashion (Kahan, 2016). An individual who judged the validity of new information based only on 
its fit with prior beliefs would disregard high validity information that contradicted those beliefs, 
information that should, rationally, lead them to update those beliefs. In the extreme, this would 
produce a completely closed cognitive system in which people accept as true any information 
that reinforced current beliefs without a mechanism for credible belief-inconsistent information 
to alter those beliefs (in Piagetian terms, all assimilation with no accommodation). Over time, 
this would lead to more extreme or rigid beliefs, rather than more correct ones.3 
The methodological implication of this normative analysis is that the more directly the 
dependent measure used in a given study captures specific validity evaluations of new 
information (judgments about the likelihood ratio) rather than general belief updating (judgments 
about the posterior probability), the less susceptible the findings are to normative 
counterexplanation.  
In arguing their point, B&J quote the following line from our paper: 
 Studies needed to measure participants’ evaluation of the validity, quality, or 
acceptance of the matched politically congenial and politically uncongenial 
information. Examples of information evaluation measures included ratings of a 
scientific study’s methodological quality, approval or disapproval of a political 
actor’s behavior, and endorsement of specific policy proposals presented in the 
stimulus materials. (p. 5)  
But fail to point out the next one: 
Studies were not included if their only evaluation measure was endorsement of a 
general political attitude (e.g., attitude toward capital punishment after reading a 
study on capital punishment) given the vulnerability of general attitudinal measures 
to normative counterexplanation. (p. 5) 
It is this distinction between the measurement of general beliefs versus specific validity 
judgments that we built into the fabric of our meta-analytic approach. To minimize the 
susceptibility of our findings to normative counterexplanation, we excluded studies that 
measured only general beliefs about a topic after exposure to new (politically congenial or 
uncongenial) information, restricting our analysis to studies in which participants judged the 
quality or validity of that new information. If individuals evaluate the same new information less 
favorably when it has politically uncongenial implications than when it has politically congenial 
implications, then a fully rational account is hard to maintain.4  
                                               
3 In their classic but now largely forgotten text, Jones and Gerard (1967) referred to this tension between closed and 
open cognitive systems as the “basic antinomy,” noting that negotiating this tension is one of the fundamental 
adaptive challenges faced by all organisms. 
 
4 This is relevant to our treatment of the MacCoun and Paletz (2009) data mentioned by B&J (pp. 4-5; Appendix). 
As was necessary for most studies included in our meta-analysis, we contacted the lead author to obtain the 
information needed to calculate separate effect sizes for liberals and conservatives. MacCoun helpfully provided 
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This is particularly evident if we also consider a second inclusion criterion of our meta-
analysis: the evaluated information had to be virtually identical in both the congenial and 
uncongenial conditions (see our section on “Manipulation of political congeniality,” pp. 4-5). In 
other words, the studies we examine in our meta-analysis all show the same basic effect: political 
partisans evaluate the exact same study methods, policy, or behavior differently depending on its 
political implications. There are two key reasons to interpret this pattern as evidence of bias. 
First, the field has consistently accepted such findings as evidence of biased judgment. The 
matched information design is arguably the most common design used in the judgment and 
decision making literature. Research on framing effects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), mental accounting (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1999), and omission 
bias (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991) all report differential judgments of identical information 
after decision-irrelevant manipulations as evidence of non-normative judgment. More 
poignantly, within stereotyping and prejudice research, the evidence forwarded for the existence 
of racial, gender, and ethnic bias is often the differential evaluation of identical information (e.g., 
identical behavior, essays, test performances, job resumes, medical records, etc.) depending on 
the demographic characteristics of the actor (e.g. Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Darley & 
Gross, 1983; Duncan, 1976; Goldberg, 1968; Green et al., 2007). If an individual evaluates the 
identical essay as lower quality when written by a female than by a male, a fully rational account 
of this difference is again hard to justify. 
Second, everyday people agree with experimental psychologists that findings such as ours 
are evidence of bias. In the published version of his Nobel Prize acceptance address, Kahneman 
(2003) suggests that one way he and Tversky approached questions of rationality was to rely on 
subjective assessments of decision makers themselves (p. 702). Presented with the famous Asian 
Disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), for example, people generally recognize that 
whether identical numerical outcomes are framed in terms of gains or losses should not rationally 
affect how those outcomes are evaluated.   
To examine how laypeople perceive the experimental evidence in our meta-analysis, we 
presented 401 U.S. Mechanical Turk workers with 1 of 4 different types of experimental results 
and asked whether or not those results demonstrated “bias” (full details of the methods and 
results of this study are presented in the supplement). The four results were: 1) evaluating the 
methods of a research study more favorably when it supports rather than opposes your political 
views (e.g., Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979); 2) approving of a policy more when the policy is 
proposed by one’s own political party than by the opposing party (e.g., Cohen, 2003); 3) using 
more lenient standards to evaluate the behavior of a member of one’s political in-group than 
one’s political out-group (e.g., Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, & Evans, 2012); and 4) evaluating the 
same essay more positively when it was written by a male than a female (e.g., Goldberg, 1968). 
In each case, over 90% of participants viewed the result in question as evidence of biased 
judgment.5 This was as true of the scientific methodology example (98%) as of the essay 
                                               
their full dataset, and thus we were able to use the dependent measure least vulnerable to normative 
counterexplanation. Consistent with our analysis plan, we used the measure asking most directly about the quality of 
the scientific evidence. This accounts for the difference between the findings we report and how the results were 
characterized in the MacCoun and Paletz abstract.   
 
5 We also included a question to assess demand characteristics “When you rated whether the study demonstrated 
bias, did you report your own personal evaluation… or did you feel pressured to respond one way or the other? 
(you will not be penalized for your response here).” The vast majority said that they reported their own personal 
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evaluation example (95%) and no differences were found across self-reported ideology. Thus, 
both judgment and decision making researchers and the very people who display these patterns 
of judgment seem to agree that matched information designs reveal patterns of judgment that are 
best characterized as bias. Moreover, as we allude to both in our original piece and earlier in this 
response, the form of partisan bias that is the focus of our meta-analysis is very much the kind of 
“bias” that both lay and professional political observers seem to complain about most 
vociferously. The rampant “whataboutism” heard in everyday political discourse on both sides of 
the aisle (“What about Obama/Trump? You didn’t complain when he went golfing!”) is 
grounded in the differential treatment of similar behavior. Thus, this particular form of bias is an 
important contributor to real world political conflict. 
Still, it is important to reiterate the genuine challenges of normative analysis and what can 
and cannot be expected of everyday lay judgment. In some situations, particularly situations 
where individuals have little knowledge or expertise, it is reasonable for people to use their 
priors to evaluate new information. Policy assessments (e.g., Cohen, 2003) are potentially 
vulnerable to this counterexplanation (see pp.12-13 of our original piece). Faced with evaluating 
an unfamiliar policy, it seems a reasonable heuristic strategy to rely on the endorsement of a 
politician or party one trusts.  
However, for many studies included in our meta-analysis, a normative account must be 
stretched to breaking in order to explain the observed patterns of judgment. A few examples: 
- The same ballot mark is judged as a legitimate vote if cast for one’s own candidate but as 
illegitimate if cast for an opponent (Kopko, McKinnon, Budziak, Devine, & Nawara, 
2011).  
- The same dirty campaign trick is judged as more wrong if used by the opposing political 
party than by one’s own party (Claasen & Ensley, 2016). 
- The identical behavior observed in a videotape of a protest is seen as more closely fitting 
the legal definition of intimidation if the protester supports a cause one supports rather 
than opposes (Kahan et al., 2012). 
In each of these cases, the combination of a vague and general prior belief (essentially 
boiling down to “my side is composed of better people than the other side”) and a very targeted 
and specific evaluative judgment make a normative account implausible. A determined Bayesian 
might argue that people typically expect candidates of their favored party to get more votes than 
their opponents, but it is much more difficult to defend the rationality of judging the exact same 
“hanging chad” as a valid vote if it was thought to be for one’s favored candidate but invalid if 
cast for a disfavored one. Similarly, one might reasonably believe that members of the opposing 
political party are less ethical than members of one’s own party (and thus more prone to dirty 
campaign tricks), but it is much less reasonable to then judge the identical dirty trick as dirtier if 
committed by a political foe than a political ally. 
In summary, the history of bias research reveals that normative counterexplanations are hard 
to shake completely (see pp.12-13 of our original piece). This is particularly true in the context 
of a meta-analysis in which the researcher cannot exert direct control over the methods used in 
the included studies. Normative analysis itself can also be challenging and complex, with 
                                               
evaluation (91.8%). After adjustment to account for possible demand concerns, the vast majority of participants still 
saw each example as evidence of bias (83% to 93%). 
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researchers frequently disagreeing about what is rational and why. B&J argue that the research 
included in our meta-analysis is irrelevant to issues of political bias, and thus to the question of 
ideological symmetry. We believe instead that there is important information to be gained about 
individuals’ susceptibility to partisan bias by carefully mining the existing experimental 
literature, and that dismissing research examining differential reactions to politically congenial 
versus politically uncongenial information is overly restrictive. Meta-analysis, like any particular 
research strategy, has both strengths and limitations. The goal of our project was to embrace 
those strengths (e.g., the ability to examine judgments about a wide range of political topics, 
based on data collected from different populations, using different methods, by many different 
researchers) while working to minimize the concomitant interpretational limitations (e.g., by 
carefully selecting studies least susceptible to Bayesian and other normative 
counterexplanations). We believe we struck this balance well, and that the findings we report add 
an important piece to the puzzle of partisan bias. 
Is social psychology liberally biased? 
B&J also devote a section of their response to disputing the notion that liberal bias is a 
problem in social psychological research and argue instead that a more severe threat to the field 
is the pressure to create false equivalencies between the left and right. Liberal bias in psychology 
was not the focus of our meta-analysis. However, we did raise the possibility that the field’s 
emphasis on conservative bias may reflect in part the challenges a liberal-dominated field would 
have in detecting the flaws of liberal thinking. So, let us address B&J’s comments with three 
brief points. 
First, there is little dispute that the field of social psychology is composed overwhelmingly of 
political liberals (Inbar & Lammer, 2012; von Hippel & Buss, 2017). Given decades of 
accumulated evidence documenting various forms of implicit and explicit ingroup favoritism 
(including the research reviewed in our meta-analysis), the simple fact that our field is composed 
almost exclusively of individuals of any single political persuasion calls for vigilance regarding 
the potential this creates for bias to creep into the research process (Duarte et al., 2015). 
Second, data suggest the field may be vulnerable to liberal bias. A recent analysis of a large 
sample of social psychology abstracts showed both that conservatives were described in more 
negative terms than liberals, and that conservatives and conservatism were portrayed as more in 
need of explanation than liberals and liberalism (Eitan et al., 2018). This builds on research from 
the 1970’s and 1980’s showing that liberal psychologists rated a manuscript as higher quality and 
more publishable when the results were favorable rather than unfavorable toward a leftist group 
(Abramowitz, Gomes, & Abramowitz, 1975) and that IRB boards approved research proposals 
less often when they hypothesized discrimination against white males than discrimination against 
ethnic minorities (Ceci, Peters, & Plotkin, 1985). Perhaps most telling, the majority of social 
psychologists explicitly reported that they would discriminate against conservatives (at least 
somewhat) in graduate admissions, faculty hiring, paper reviews, and grant reviews (Inbar & 
Lammer, 2012).6 
                                               
6 The piece of evidence B&J provide that calls into question the assumption of liberal bias is a paper by King, 
Avery, Hebl, and Cortina (2017), which according to B&J suggests that “‘liberal’ topics such as gender equality and 
demographic diversity are subject to higher rates of rejection and revision in the publication process, compared to 
mediocre articles on other topics” (p. 21). We find this characterization a bit misleading. King et al.’s results across 
two studies demonstrated “virtually identical” rates of acceptance and rejection, and no differences in the number of 
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Finally, that social psychology as a field should be concerned about the potential for liberal 
bias in no way mitigates concerns about the potential for other types of bias to influence our 
practices and conclusions. A bias toward finding equivalence between liberals and 
conservatives—if it exists—would be as problematic as a bias against liberals or conservatives 
(see p. 12 of our original piece). Although we put little stock in B&J’s use of an anecdote to 
support their argument (p. 22), we also suspect that some researchers may indeed be more 
comfortable finding equivalence rather than difference across political and demographic groups, 
particularly on valued characteristics like rationality or intelligence. A preference for patterns of 
equivalence across groups may even be one way that liberal bias manifests itself (Winegard, 
Clark, Hasty, & Baumeister, 2018).  
We reiterate our position that bias of any kind poses a threat to scientific validity, and that the 
new ethos of methodological rigor taking hold in the field can be as helpful in the realm of 
political psychology as in all other areas of psychological science (and science in general for that 
matter). 
Future Research 
B&J clearly disagree with us about the value of our meta-analytic findings. We have now 
both made our case on that score and readers can decide what arguments they find most 
compelling. At this point, the most fruitful path forward is to think through how future research 
might advance our understanding of political reasoning, not merely to further adjudicate the 
relation between political orientation and judgmental bias, but to clarify crucial conceptual and 
methodological issues that can impede or facilitate research progress. 
One path that we believe will not be productive for future research is a focus on documenting 
the relative accuracy of liberal and conservative beliefs. An important subtext that runs 
throughout B&J’s response is that liberals can be said to be less biased than conservatives based 
on the fact that liberal beliefs are closer to factual truth than conservative beliefs. Even those 
who have sympathy for some variant of this argument can recognize the significant challenges of 
pursuing it empirically. More importantly, documenting the accuracy of political beliefs offers 
little insight into psychological process. Knowing that one’s side’s beliefs are more accurate than 
the other side’s beliefs tells us precious little about why those accuracy differences exist.  
This point is well-illustrated by considering two hypothetical ways that liberals and 
conservatives might develop differential factual beliefs about a political topic. One possibility is 
that both liberals and conservatives base their judgments on the identical body of information, 
but process that identical information in different fashions and thus reach different beliefs. This 
is the possibility tested by the studies included in our meta-analysis. The studies all examine 
partisan bias under controlled experimental circumstances in which differences in prior 
information are controlled by confronting participants with closely matched scenarios differing 
only in the partisan attachments they evoke. Concerns about potential normative 
                                               
rounds of review, reviewer recommendations, or quality ratings for manuscripts with and without a diversity focus. 
Drawing from B&J’s use of the word “mediocre” to qualify their claim, we suspect B&J are referring to a 
marginally significant (p = .05) interaction between diversity focus and perceived quality on reviewer 
recommendations within one of two quality conditions. Specifically, among lower quality manuscripts (but not 
higher quality ones), there was a stronger relationship between quality and recommendations among diversity focus 
papers than among non-diversity focus papers. In our view, this is not compelling evidence for the claim that liberal 
topics are subject to greater scrutiny in psychology. 
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counterexplanations point out the limitations of the studies in achieving this ideal informational 
equivalence, but to the extent that the studies successfully minimize the influence of prior beliefs 
and other confounding factors, any differences in belief are attributable solely to biased 
information processing.  
But there is another obvious way that liberals and conservatives could develop different 
factual beliefs. Even if political partisans processed information in a completely unbiased 
manner, their beliefs could still differ because the information bases they derive those beliefs 
from differ. Such informational differences could theoretically account for differential beliefs 
without the need to assume any differential (i.e., biased) processing of information once that 
information is received. Liberals and conservatives could have different beliefs solely because 
their beliefs are based on different bodies of information. 
What is important to note here is that documenting that liberals and conservatives have 
different beliefs tells us nothing about which of the two accounts above (or some other) explains 
those differences. Differential beliefs could result from differential processing of the same 
information or similar processing of differential information, or some hybrid account (the most 
plausible account in our minds based on the available data is that the differential beliefs of 
liberals and conservatives are a function of both biased processing and selective exposure 
tendencies). 
 The same analysis can be extended to a situation in which one set of differential beliefs (for 
example, the ones held by liberals) are shown to be more factually accurate than the other. 
Documenting that the beliefs of liberals and conservatives differ in accuracy does nothing to 
disentangle whether those accuracy differences are explained by differences in the degree of bias 
the two sides show in their processing of information, differences in the extent to which the two 
sides expose themselves selectively to belief-supportive information, or even perhaps whether 
the two sides differ neither in biased processing nor selective exposure tendencies, but that the 
information presented by one side’s media is more accurate than the information presented by 
the other side’s media.7 
A similar multi-faceted approach can be directed toward isolating contributors to biased 
processing itself. Political events occur daily, even hourly, but elections--the only events that 
galvanize many people’s attention on political considerations--occur only every few years. For 
that reason, memory processes (e.g., Did the economy do well or poorly during Obama’s time in 
office?) likely play an important role in many real world political judgments. It is possible that 
memory reconstruction provides more fertile ground for partisan biases to emerge (Frenda, 
Knowles, Saletan, & Loftus, 2013) than the online processing of political information explored 
by the experiments included in our meta-analysis. The overall pattern of partisan bias we 
examined--more favorable judgments of politically-congenial than politically-uncongenial 
information--can also be decomposed into two separate components: the uncritical acceptance of 
politically-congenial information and the defensive rejection of politically-uncongenial 
information (see Garrett & Stroud, 2014, for a similar approach to selective exposure processes). 
                                               
7 One might argue that this last possibility merely pushes the question back one step (How do you then explain why 
one side’s media contain more accurate information than the other side’s?). But differences in media content could 
potentially be a function of non-psychological factors (e.g., economic pressures and incentives, historical trends, 
strategic political decision making). Any of these possibilities would have to be examined and confirmed 
empirically, but it is important for political psychologists to recognize that not all political phenomena are 
explainable solely with psychology. 
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These two components could be fully or partially dependent on different psychological 
mechanisms. Teasing apart this distinction was beyond the scope of our meta-analysis, but future 
research should explore these processes independently to identify both common and unique 
contributors to each. 
There are two take home points we wish to make here. The first is that accuracy and 
rationality are different things--accuracy refers to judgment outcomes, rationality refers to 
judgment processes--and exploring the factual accuracy of judgments will do little to uncover the 
psychological processes that contribute to the different (and likely even differentially accurate) 
factual worlds inhabited by liberals and conservatives. This is not to say that exploring 
judgments where normative criteria apply cannot be a helpful research strategy. For example, 
presenting participants with outcome tables from which an objective correlation coefficient could 
be calculated has been used to document how greater cognitive sophistication can encourage 
rather than mitigate partisan bias (Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2017). In the same vein, 
B&J point to the potential utility of studies examining sensitivity to argument quality (Stanovich 
& West, 1997; 1998). Research on motivated reasoning outside of a political context has used 
this technique to demonstrate biased processing, showing that people are more sensitive to the 
quality of arguments for non-preferred judgment conclusions than for preferred ones (Ditto et al., 
1998). 8 In both of these examples, however, it is important to recognize that the behavior of 
participants is being compared to standards of rationality (whether a given piece of information 
is used appropriately according to normative or even mathematical standards of judgment) not 
standards of accuracy (whether the belief participants ultimately express matches some standard 
of independently verifiable truth). Even comparing the accuracy of political beliefs “issue by 
issue,” as B&J suggest (p. 19), would tell us very little about which of the many different 
psychological processes described above might have contributed to any inaccuracy we might 
find. 
The second and equally important point we wish to make here, however, is that 
distinguishing inaccuracy from bias makes clear that partisan bias is not one thing but many. The 
“alternative facts” possessed by liberals and conservatives may differ (both from each other 
and/or from reality) because of the biased interpretation of political information, biased memory 
for political information, biased exposure to political information, etc. Liberals and conservatives 
could differ in their susceptibility to all, some, or none of these biases, and research is needed to 
carefully explore each of these unique psychological processes as potential contributors to the 
growing fact gap between liberals and conservatives.  
It is similarly beneficial to recognize the complexity of other aspects of the ideological 
symmetry issue as well. A recent review of the literature makes a powerful case for the 
“contingent, contextual” relation between individual difference factors and political attitudes 
(Federico & Malka, 2018). For example, considerable data suggest that the needs for security 
                                               
8 Thinking through such an experiment in a political context nicely demonstrates the independence of bias and 
accuracy. Liberals believe more in the reality of climate change than conservatives, a situation where we can 
plausibly assume liberal beliefs correspond more closely to the actual state of the world than conservative beliefs. 
We would predict from past research (Ditto et al., 1998) that if presented with strong and weak arguments for and 
against the reality of climate change, liberals would be sensitive to the quality of arguments against the reality of 
climate change, but when presented with information supporting its reality, they would be equally persuaded by a 
low quality study as by a high quality one. In this hypothetical example, liberal’s insensitivity to the quality of 
politically-congenial information could be argued to be biased, but biased in favor of a factually accurate belief. 
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and certainty that Jost and others (Jost, 2017; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) take 
as primary evidence for ideological asymmetry are associated more reliably with social 
conservatism than economic conservatism (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, 
& Baldacci, 2008; Johnston & Wronski, 2015). The relation between these needs and 
endorsement of a particular political ideology is also contingent upon national context (Federico 
& Malka, 2018). For example, research in Western countries finds that variables related to the 
needs for security and certainty show the expected positive relation with conservative ideology, 
but in formerly Communist countries (which until relatively recently were dominated by 
governments espousing egalitarian ideologies) the data show these needs to be most pronounced 
in individuals who associate themselves with left-wing rather than right-wing politics (Malka, 
Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014; Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). 
All of this complexity suggests that future research will move forward best when it moves 
beyond conceptualizing partisan bias as a unitary construct with a context-independent and 
historically-invariant relation to political orientation. There are many varieties of partisan bias to 
be explored, many political inclinations underlying the liberal-conservative continuum to be 
disentangled, and many contextual factors that could exacerbate or mitigate partisan attachments 
and animosities and thus alter how, when, and in whom partisan bias reveals itself most strongly. 
Pursuing this complexity could potentially result in a more flattering portrait of some political 
ideologies than others, or the picture that emerges may be more mixed and conditional. But 
whatever the data hold, the image will be a psychological one, rich in nuance, varied in tint and 
hue, rather than a political one, colored only in shades of red or blue. 
Final Remarks 
To us, it seems ironic and more than a little bewildering that social psychologists are 
drifting into this relativistic view of morality and politics just as authoritarian 
conservatism (and illiberal hostility to democratic norms) seem to be reaching new 
heights of popularity and brazenness not only in Trump’s America but also in 
Erdogan’s Turkey, Orban’s Hungary, and Netanyahu’s Israel. (B&J p. 4) 
B&J are clearly troubled by recent political developments in the United States and 
worldwide. We are too. We fail to see the irony, however, in separating our pursuit of scientific 
understanding from our feelings as concerned citizens of both the U.S. and the world.  
The struggle to maintain scientific objectivity is particularly crucial for political psychology 
(Tetlock, 1994), and all of us who study it must work, at every step throughout the research 
process, to maintain as clear a firewall as we can manage between the prescriptive world of 
politics and the descriptive world of psychological science. B&J contend that our research 
suggests a “relativistic view of morality and politics.” But any equivalence we argue for is 
psychological not moral. Our findings have nothing to do with who is currently the leader of 
Turkey, Hungary, Israel, or the U.S. It is similarly a mistake if readers take the findings of our 
meta-analysis as a condemnation of political liberalism or as a vindication of political 
conservatism. Our research should be viewed through a purely descriptive lens. 
It should surprise no reader of our current exchange with B&J that we emerge from it 
convinced of the quality of our methods and the value of our findings. One goal of this response, 
however, was to be more precise about the nature of our claims, and to situate our findings in a 
broader consideration of the complex psychological, social, and historical dynamics of partisan 
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reasoning. If our original piece encouraged a more expansive interpretation of our findings than 
is warranted, we hope to have modulated that interpretation here.  
We would be similarly unsurprised if, after reading our response to theirs, B&J remain 
convinced of the incisiveness of their critique and maintain their conviction in Jost’s (2017) 
conclusion that political conservatism is associated with biased reasoning and inaccurate beliefs. 
Our hope, however, is that this exchange may lead B&J to modulate their claims as well. 
Research documenting particular ideological asymmetries in motivated social cognition is 
compelling, but so too is a growing body of research questioning the generality of these 
asymmetries (e.g., Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Brandt, Wetherell, 
& Reyna, 2014; Collins, Crawford, & Brandt, 2017; Conway et al., 2016; 2017; Federico & 
Malka, 2018; Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017; Malka, Lelkes, & Holzer, 2017; Nisbett, Cooper, & 
Garrett, 2015; Pennycook & Rand, 2018; Washburn & Skitka, 2017; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De 
Pauw, 2010). We believe strongly that a key impediment to future research progress, an 
impediment that our original piece contributed to unfortunately, is to continue to frame the 
ideological symmetry issue as a simple question of which side, liberals or conservatives, is more 
biased. Research will progress most effectively once proponents of both the symmetry and 
asymmetry positions recognize the multi-faceted, context sensitive, and historically-bounded 
nature of partisan bias.  
When two sets of researchers offer what seem to be conflicting views of a phenomenon, the 
question that inevitably emerges is, “Which of the two is right?” But the question we entertained 
in our original piece, and have yet to revisit in this one, is what if we both are right? What if 
there is good empirical evidence for both of our contentions: that conservatism is associated with 
a relatively simple and rigid thinking style, but also that, when placed under careful laboratory 
conditions, liberals and conservatives show similar levels of partisan bias?  
We discussed several potential resolutions in our original piece, but let us expand on one here 
that we mentioned previously only in passing. What if bias is not the sole province of the simple-
minded? A key assumption underlying B&J’s position is that the cognitive style of conservatives 
makes them more susceptible to partisan bias, or stated in the opposite way, that the more 
systematic thinking style of liberals protects them from it. But this view of integratively simple 
thinking as cognitively inferior has been questioned (e.g., Kahan, 2016; Tetlock, Armor, & 
Peterson, 1994; Tetlock & Tyler, 1996). Motivated reasoning involves both systematic and 
heuristic reasoning processes (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; 
Ditto et al., 1998; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997) and there is a growing body of research 
suggesting that greater cognitive sophistication and expertise often predicts greater levels of 
political bias not less (Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2017; Liu & Ditto, 2013; Nyhan, Reifler, & 
Ubel, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Cognitive sophistication 
may allow people to more skillfully argue for their preferred conclusions, thus improving their 
ability to convince others—and themselves—that their beliefs are correct (Mercier & Sperber, 
2011).  
It is possible then that even if liberals have a more thoughtful cognitive style than 
conservatives, it may offer them little protection against biased judgment, and in some cases, 
could actually operate in service of it. If true, the inconsistency between our findings and Jost’s 
body of work begins to dissolve, and the focus of future research shifts toward exploring whether 
and how bias might operate differently in people high and low in cognitive reflection (or under 
conditions that promote or degrade an individual’s capacity for effortful cognitive analysis).  
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In our view, the most appropriate take home point from our research is that people across the 
political spectrum are vulnerable to partisan bias. This fits with a wealth of research suggesting 
that motivated reasoning and ingroup favoritism are not mere bugs in our cognitive system, but 
rather fundamental features of human thought (Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Kunda, 1990; 
Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 
2013; Tajfel, 1970). It also suggests that vigilance regarding one’s own susceptibility to partisan 
favoritism is an appropriate epistemic stance for anyone engaged in the political arena.  
In the current political climate, it is tempting for liberals, and perhaps especially liberal 
scientists, to see themselves (based on an implicit connection between thoughtfulness and 
protection from bias) as a rational baseline to be compared to conservative irrationality (e.g., 
Eitan et al., 2018). If our field’s current reproducibility crisis has taught us anything, however, it 
is the vulnerability of even smart, experienced, and well-intentioned individuals to biased 
reasoning. 
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